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The relationship between liberal thought, capitalism and the development of 
segregationist policies in South Africa was first outlined by Maftin Legassick in a 
series of three unpublished but highly acclaimed seminar papers. His ideas have 
subsequensly been developed by a number of other writers, most notably Paul Rich and 
J W Cell. Legassick's work was intended as an explicit challenge to the liberal 
assumption that apartheid is incompatible with economic growth and that the 
existence of racist ideas represents a '*hangover" of archaic forms of thought. In 
arguing that the processes of segregation and industrialization are inextricably 
linked, Legassick forwards two important propositions: first, the notion that 
liberal segregationists were directly engaged in elaborating policies designed 
actively to promote capitalist development in South Africa, and, second, the idea 
that white liberals, by acting as agents of vsocial control" rather than as a force 
for I1benefici 1 reform", helped to secure the conditions for capitalism's long-term 6 
reproduction. These propositions, though closely associated, are different in 
important respects, and Legassick is not always clear which one it is that he 
adheres to. With this in mind, my intention in this paper is to explore the 
interaction of liberalism, segregation, and capitalist industrialization. Finally, 
I suggest that the concept of '*social control" requires refining. 
A strong case can be made for the argument that liberal social theorists 
like Howard Pim, Edgar Brookes and Charies T Loram played an important role in the 
elaboration of segregationist ideology. These writers were vitally concerned to 
advance a theory of territorial segregation as a solution to South Africa's "native 
question1*. They sought to establish a comprehensive policy which, by humanizing the 
nature of white domination and facilitating African *'advancementw, would avert any 
serious challenge to white supremacy. It may be objected that, in suggesting such 
schemes, they were not liberals at all and might better be described as (say) 
Ifbenevolent paternalistsl'. However, the writers and activists with whom we are 
concerned clearly identified themselves as forming part of the South African liberal 
tradition. Moreover, they played key roles in liberal organizations like the South 
African Institute of Race Relations during the inter-war years. On these grounds 
alone they may therefore be referred to as such. 
The theorists of segregation were, above all, responding to the pattern of 
South Africa's process of industrialization. They were greatly alarmed by the 
declining ability of the reserves to feed their populations, the dissolution of 
"tribalt' bonds, the rapid migration of African men and women into the cities, and 
the emergence of a politically conscious industrial proletariat. These fears were 
underscored in the immediate post-World War One era by such events as the formation 
of the Industrial and Commercial Workerst Union in 1919, the 1920 Mineworkers1 
Strike, the Bulhoek rising of 1921, and the massacre of the Bondelswarts in 1922. In 
this context segregation was conceived of as a defensive strategy which would permit 
the development of capitalist industrialization in South Africa while containing the 
vast social forces unleashed by that process. 
Liberal segregationists were concerned to distance themselves from the 
species of laissez faire, universalist liberalism which they associated with the 
mid-Victorian missionaries and politicians of the Cape Colony. This represented a 
shift away from earlier concerns with common citizenship and individual equality 
before the law, to a consideration of just ways in which to administer the 
indigenous African population. The understanding of the I1neww liberals was informed 
by the British colonial experience as well as early experiments in indirect rule and 
trusteeship. The history of Jim Crow legislation in the American South and a direct 
acquaintance with the ideas of Booker T Washington convinced them that "social 
differentiation" was a natural human state. Africans, they concluded, were ideally 
suited to a rural existence, where they could aim at achieving agricultural 
self-sufficiency while being shielded from the harsh and corrupting influences of 
"industrialismt1. The prevalence of eugenist notions about the dangers of 
"mi~cegenation~~ and the inevitable I9degenerationlt of black and white races in the 
industrial context persuaded many observers of the need to prevent direct 
competition for jobs as far as possible and to preserve "racial puritytt. 
Liberal segregationists participated closely in the development of social 
anthropology as an academic subject during the 1920s. Their confident belief in the 
efficacy of positivist science led them to trust in the advice of f*expertsnt as a 
means of solving complex social problems. Anthropology's recognition of the 
essential worth of traditional "tribaltf structures lent credence to the idea that 
llcivilisationlf was not a universally transmissable quality. A "scientific1* study of 
the distinctiveness of "native mentalitytf promised to disclose solutions to the 
"native questionl1. The pluralist and relativist notion of ~lculture~~ seemed to 
transcend the evolutionist assumptions of both the Victorian "civilising thesis1* 
(uihich envisaged a universal, upward progression of Itprimitive" peoples from a state 
of "barbarousI1) as well as social Darwinist theories (which assumed the existence of 
an innate and immutable racial hierarchy). Segregation was therefore seen as a 
viable and humane means by which to encourage the development of diverse flculturestt 
along the lines of their "natural advancew. 
Segregation, it was constantly stressed, was a pragmatic, moderate and 
flexible policy, designed to transcend the diamepcally opposed positions 
represented by ftRepressioniststf and "Equaliststt. According to Edgar Brookes, 
segregation was the natural Ifway out between the Scylla of identity and the 
Charybdis of sub or din at ion^^.^ The idea that segregation was a workable compromise 
between two unpalatable alterriatives ("identity" as associated with the nineteenth 
century Cape, and "subordinationn as represented by the Boer repub3ics and to some 
extent Natal), is a constantly recurring theme in liberal thought. Its portrayal 
in these terms laid the ground for segregation's emergence as a hegemonic or 
consensus ideology within white South Africa. The very flexibility of 
segregationist discourse added to its attractiveness. It provided a ready 
vocabulary which, when taken up by leading politicians, spoke to different interests 
within the dominant classes: to farmers, segregation meant a ready supply and even 
distribution of cheap labour; capitalists were reassured that the system of migrant 
labour on which they had come to depend would remain undisturbed; whi'te workers 
hoped that segregation would protect them from competition in the job market. 
Africans were also drawn into the language of segregation by promises of more land 
and the restoration of traditional forms of authority. Segregation resonated with 
the growing spirit of Africanist separatism of the 1920s and the increasing struggle 
to defend communal resources. 
In the period before 1925 (the year in which General Hertzog outlined his "Native 
Bills" at Smithfield), liberal theorists helped to define the "native question*' and 
to invest segregationist discourse with a much needed vocabulary. There is even 
evidence of direct collusion between Hertzog and key liberal thinkers. According to 
John Cell, C T Loram not only supported Hert50g1s segregationist programme but also 
helped him to draft speeches in its depnce. In private, Loram claimed to have 
written the Smithfield speech himself. A W Roberts, a colleague of Loramls on the 
Native Affairs Commission and ex-teacher at Lovedale Institution, also seems to have 
had a hand in the process. At Hertzogns request, he wrote a lengthy memorandum With 
the cumbersome title "Certain Reflections on the Existence of a Native People in 
South Africa, and of the Need for a Clear Policy in Dealing with Them". This 
document was submitted just a few months before the Smithfield speech, and 
maintained that "the ideal arrangement would be to p~ve territorial segregation, 
with economic segregation only as far as possible". 
Edgar Brookes's early support for Iiertzog is widely known, as is his 
renunciation of segregation after 1927-28. Publication of Brookes* segregationist 
manifesto, The History of Native Policy, was personally arranged by Hertzog. The 
Prime Minister greeted Brookes' manuscript with "immense pleasure" and wrote him an 
enthusiastic letter expressing "the perffct harmony of views and sentiments between 
you and me on this momentous question". For a short period Brookes became known 
as one of the key interpreters of segregation. The Cape Times suggested that he 
mighI2be "a John the Baptist who is making straight the way for the Prime Minister 
I1 
. a .  
Howard Pim was another liberal figure involved in the conception of 
territorial segregation. His 1905 address to the British hsociation, in which he 
argued for a reserve-based policy of segregation, attra$ged the enthusiastic 
attention of contemporary officials and opinion-makers. As late as 1925-26 Pim 
was committed to an alteration in the non-racial Cape franchise and the need to 
secure additional areas for African occupation in terns of the 1913 Land Act. The 
only point on which he departed from Hertzogts Smithfield proposals in any 
~ignificant~~espect was his opposition to the institution of a statutory industrial 
colour bar. 
Hertzog was able to draw on liberal support because of the belief that be 
was most effectively placed to carry out a comprehensive solution of the "native 
questiontf and that his personal intentions were honourable and benign. If same 
liberal segregationists harboured misgivings about the 1926 colour bar or the 
abolition of the Cape Franchise, these were suppressed for the moment. They 
continued to believe that the progressive elements of the Smithfield proposals could 
only be strengthened by supporting the Prime Minister. However, by about 1927-28 
there was marked liberal disillusionment with the whole idea of segregation. 
Legassick characterizes this period as the first significant breach in thinking on 
"native policyIf since Union; it represented "the birth oflyodern South African 
liberalism reconnecting with its antecedents in the Capett. 
Brookest recantation after 1927 was the most public expression of this 
process. In 1926 he was still advocating Hertzogite policies (lt~&th certain 
amendmentsIt) as an expression of "wise and moderate liberali~m~~. But in October 
he asked for a private interview with Hertzog and submitted a memorandum which 
included detailed amendments to the "Native Bills". Though he did not yet attack 
the principle of segregation as a whole, it is evident that the lack of political 
representation for ffdetribalisedtl and "educated" Afrips, "like my friend Professor 
Jabavul1, had begun to prey heavily on his conscience. Other former advocates of 
segregation changed their views at about the same time. In his keynote address to 
the 1927 European-Bantu Conference, Howard Pim argued that the reserve system "had 
been shattered and it could not be rebuilttt. To astonished cries of "Not1, he was 
reported 88 saying that segregation was quite impossible Itexcept under conditions of 
slaverytf. Two years later Pim declared himself a Itconvinced believer i the 
principle enunciated by ih. Rhodes of equal rights for all civilised men1t.49 This 
marked a conscious re-identification on his part with the principle of conamon 
citizenship and the idealized liberal values associated with the nineteenth-century 
Cape. 
In accounting for the liberal break with segregation, the 1926 Colour Bar 
Act, the 1927 Native Administration Act and the failure to implement fully the 
provisions of Smuts1s1920 Native Affairs Act were significant. The palpable 
hardening of political debate following the publication of Hertzogls "Native Bills" 
in 1926 was a further contributory factor. Also important was the pressure exerted 
upon white liberals by African members of the Joint Council movement and delegates 
to the 1923 and 1927 "European-Bantu" conferences. But something more was required 
to weld these misgivings into a coherent, theoretical critique of segregation's 
fundamental assumptions. This emerged from within the liberal intellectual paradigm 
itself, in the form of an entire reformulation of the economic basis of segregation 
and its relationship to industrialization. 
It is primarily to the historian W M Macmillan and his student, 
S H Frankel, that we should look in this regard. By the early 1920s Macmillan came 
to realize that the plight of poor whites and poor blacks was essentially linked. 
His path-breaking investigation into agrarian conditions led him to the realization 
that the South African political economy was a complex, interdependent whole. The 
economy of the reserves was integrally dependent on that of industry; it W%, 
therefore, meaningless to talk about separate or differential developments. 
Macmillan~s insights were elaborated on and set within a more rigorous framework by 
the economist S H Frankel. From 1926 Frankel was explicitly critical of those (like 
Edgar Brookes) who spoke of "economic aspects of the Native Problemft: that problem 
was merely "one aspect of South Africa's economic policy in general". Frankel 
reiterated Macmillants argument that segregationist schemes were absurd "in the face 
of an outworn2yd economically unsound tribalism, appalling overcrowding, ignorance 
and poverty". The essential interdependence of black and white in a unitary 
economy rendered segregation impossible. 
The full implications of Macmillants "economic school" were never fully 
accepted. Some liberals continued to believe in segregation as the best theoretical 
solution to the "native question", even if economic realities rendered it 
practically impossible. Nevertheless, the insights of Macmillan and Frankel played 
a decisive role in mainstream liberalismts rejection of segregation in its 
Hertzogite form. Macmillan's perception of the essential unity of the South African 
economy underlines what is perhaps segregation's dominant contradiction: its 
ideology was given material life as a result of fears arising from South Africans 
rapid industrialization process; but the economic integration of black and white 
which industrialization entailed meant that separate development was no longer a 
feasible alternative. 
In the decade between 1926 and 1936, the main focus of liberal political activity 
was directed towards opposing Hertzogqs "Native Bills1!. In this regard the most 
important liberal organizations were the Joint Councils of Europeans and Natives, 
which were established in urban centres after 1921, and the South African Institute 
of Race Relations (sAIRR), which was founded in 1929. Membership of the Joint 
Councils comprised prominent liberal professionals, African politicians, academics, 
churchmen, and welfare workers. Many of-these individuals were closely tied into 
the international mission network which Richard Elphick has suggestively termed the 
"benevolent empire". The Joint Councils drew on the conse~~vative ideology of 
moderation and gradual political reform championed especially by Booker T Washington 
in the American South. Their primary interest was in matters of social welfare, but 
they also attempted, by means of discussion and research, to "build bridges" between 
whites and blacks as well as to influence the direction of government policies. In 
the absence of statutory bodies which could mediate between whites and blacks, the 
politically centrist Joint Councils and the SAIFlR occupied a unique position 9 9  they played a major role in co-ordinating opposition to the Segregation Bills. 
Until the late 1920s the Joint Councils appeared to evade the question of 
the non-racial franchise, hoping instead to win concessions on the land question. 
This involved campaigning for an extension of the reserves and promoting leasehold 
tenure in the released areas (along the model of crofter legislation in Scotland) in 
order to facilitate the emergence of an African yeoman peasantry. Increasingly, 
however, the issue of the franchise dominated political discussion, and on this 
matter the Joint Councils were highly equivocal. In 1927, the Pretoria Joint 
Council declared itself in favour of the principle of Hertzogfs Representation Bill, 
provided 29at an adequate quid pro quo for the abolition of the Cape franchise was 
provided. On the other hand, the Johannesburg Joint Council took the view that, 
while it was not in favour of differential political treatment for2f4fricans, partial 
and differential representation might be necessary in the interim. 
As a general rule, the Joint Councils defended the existing Cape franchise 
on the grounds that Africans had never abused their voting rights, that there was no 
evidence to support the idea of a "native menace", and that the existence of the 
Cape franchise was widely regarded by Africans as the wtouchstonel' of good faith on 
the part of whites.25 However, they tended to shy away from active support of the 
franchise or of common citizenship. In 1928 the Johannesburg Joint Council took a 
more definite stand in favour of the non-ra~ial~panchise, with the publication of 
its pamphlet, In Defence of the Cape Franchise. But, for those liberals who 
continued to argue as critics rather than opponents of segregation, this comitment 
was undermined in practice. W K Hancock observes that 
One of the most frequent ar-ents by which the 
defenders of the Cape franchise sought to ward off 
the attacks of its enemies was the argument that the 
franchise made no difference - and presumably would 
never be permitted to make any difference - to the 
political supremacy of the white population. A 
liberalism so lacking in self-confidence could not 
inspire a strong fighting spirit: in substance, it 
had cap@ulated to its enemies before the battle 
opened. 
Leading members of the Joint Councils and the SAIRR like Alfred Hoernle, 
Edgar Brookes and J D Rheinallt Jones were all amenable, at various times, to 
arriving at a compromise settlement on the "Native  bill^^^. From 1928-29, the Joint 
Councils and the SAIRR maintained a public commitment to the maintenance of the Cape 
franchise, but in private reformism and accommodation were to the fore. There are 
many instances of this type of equivocation. For example, in 1928 J D Rheinallt 
Jones argued that, once the central principle of common citizenship was abandoned, 
"we are forced into a quagmire of difficultiesff. However, this statement was 
weakened by his qualification that the Cape franchise would be defended Ifuntil the 
country offers some other alternati~g~that does not endanger the status of the Bank 
people and the safety of the State". Similarly, in 1930, Jones submitted a 
confidential memorandum to the Council movement in which he asserted that the 
central principle of a common franchise s&uld be upheld until "the time is right" 
to put forward constructive alternatives. 
The willingness of the Joint Councils to concede the principle of the 
common franchise in return for a more equitable distribution of land between black 
and white underlined the fact that they continued to argue within the terms of 
segregationist discourse. The conservatism of the SAIRR and, in particular, 
Rheinallt Jones wgg condemned by more radical liberals like William Ballinger and 
Margaret Hodgson. The SAIRR was also criticized by an older strand of liberal 
thinking represented by such organizations as the Non-Racial Franchise Association 
(NRFA) and the Cape Native Franchise Vigilance Committee. The NRFA was founded in 
1929 by Sir James Rose Innes, J W Jagger, Henry Burton, and Sir Clarkson Tredgold. 
These ageing political grandees exemplified the remnants3pf what Stanley Trapido has 
referred to as the "great tradition" of Cape liberalism. They were uncompromising 
supporters of common citizenship and resolutely upheld the principle of the non- 
racial franchise as an entrenched constitutional right, subject only to a 
lfcivilization testtf. Implicit in these ideas was the notion that classic liberal 
values constituted the best guarantee of social order. As J W Jagger pointed out 
(invoking a well known metaphor), "there is wisdom in ssoviding a safety valve, in 
allowing a free outlet for the expression of opinionN. 
The NRFA persistently criticized the South African Party's weak defence of 
the common franchise as well as the accommodationism of the SAIRR. Thus Rose Innes 
informed Rheinallt Jones in 1929 that it was impossible for him l1at any stage of the 
struggle which is yet in sight to advise the Natives to make the best of things and 
save something out of the wreck". That time might come, but until theggthe wise 
course was to "stand upon the principle of no colour differentiationf1. Notably, 
the NRFA was not a proponent of the universal franchise. It was fully prepared to 
raise the voting qualifi~ations,~~hould the widespread contemporary fears of black 
electoral domination prove real. The NRFAts commitment to common citizenship 
should, therefore, not be seen as a mere sentimental attachment to Cape liberalism - 
as some of its critics often suggested. On the contrary, it was founded on a belief 
that the future stability of South Africa would be most effectively secured by the 
gradual political incorporation of an improving African elite. 
Drawing on Legassick, Shula Marks observes that segregation was "a set of policies 
specifically design84 to cope with the strains of a society undergoing rapid 
industrializationn. This idea has won widespread academic acceptance. However, 
it leaves open the problem of how segregation and industrialization relate to each 
other. One interpretation seeks to emphasize the idea that segregationist policies 
were instrumental in the development of capitalism in South Africa. This is the 
clear implication of Wolpe's argument that segregation functioned to subsidize 
industry's labour costs by ensuring that the burden of the labour force's so5f;al 
reproduction was partly met by the pre-capitalist economies of the reserves. 
Martin Lacey adopts a related version of this thesis, insisting that segregation was 
"not only compatible with economic growth but was @signed as a coercive labour 
system geared to ensure capitalist profitability". 
A more subtle interpretation places emphasis on segregation as a political 
response to the impact of industrialization and the emergence of a politically 
conscious African proletariat. Legassick veers between these two views. At times 
he argues that liberal segregationists acted as agents of "social control1' by 
deflecting and defusing the social conflict associated with capitalist 
industrialization. But at other moments he appears to commit himself to the idea 
that segregation was consciously adopted in order to promote capitalist development. 
Consider the following passage: 
the elaboration of the policy of 'segregation' was 
a specific and self-conscious attempt to formulate 
a 'native policy' appropriate to conditions of 
capitalist economic growth. And this not even in 
the 'weak' sense of preserving an existing social 
structure under new conditions, but rather in the 
'strong' sense of elaborating a policy which would 
actually promote such growth in the speci 
conditions which existed in South Africa. SA= 
The above passage concisely summarizes two distinct ways in which 
segregation may be said to have been appmpriate to capitalist development. Yet, in 
his work Legassick tends to blur the distinction between these two meanings, as do 
other writers on the topic. My contention here is that the relationship between 
liberal segregationists and capitalist development can be meaningfully understood 
only in the first sense outlined by Legassick above, i.e. in the "weakl'sense of 
preserving the existing social structure under the new conditions of South Africa's 
rapid industrialization process. 
Howard Pim's paper to the 1905 meeting of the British Association is a 
case in point. His argument that the reserves should function as "sanitoriaV where 
labour might be recruited without cost to the white communi$g has been furnished as 
evidence of the validity of Wolpe's reserve-subsidy thesis. On closer inspection, 
however, this emphasis appears to be misplaced. Pim's advocacy of a reserve-based 
policy of segregation was not, in the first instance, a manifesto for the 
procurement of cheap labour. His primary concern was with the maintenance of social 
discipline and control which, he considered, was essential to the self-preservation 
of whites and could be achieved most effectively by utilizing the existing "tribalt1 
system. For Pim, segregation was corpatible w i t h  rather than n m  to 
capitalist development; its chief advantage was the social and political stability 
it offered in the context of South Africa's industrialization process. 
A consistent theme in the writings of "moderate" segregationists is the 
idea that through segregation the social threat posed by a politicized African 
proletariat could be defused, but that this required an economic sacrifice on behalf ' 
of whites. For Maurice Evans, segregation was incompatible with rapacious economic 
greed. It was therefore not in the long-term interests of whites to submit to 
immediate calls for cheap African labour: 
For our own ultimate good .,. the points of contact 05 
the races are already too many and too close, and to 
multiply them and intensify them for what is at 
bottom, our economic gain, is a policy likely to be 
fraught with a i l  for both races. The easy way is the 
perilous way. 
The idea crops up over and over again in liberal thought of the 1920s and 
1930s. J H Hofmeyr, who attempted to redefine a "new1* or wrestrainedal iberalism in 
the immediate aftermath of the 1936 segregation legislation, considered that a 
thoroughgoing policy of "constructive segregation" - though in theory still the berat 
solution of the "native question1I - was no longer feasible. This was so because 
whites were not prepared to '*pay the price": i.e. to set aside sufficient land f q l  
Africans' requirements or to make do with more expensive and less abmdant labour. 
A notable feature of Edgar Brookesl writings on segregation is the id- 
that (white) South Africa should defend itself from the threat posed by a militant 
African proletariat. This theme recurs throughout his writings, even as his 
attitude to segregation underwent transformation. Writing in 1923, he a r p d  that 
it was neither to the advantage of whites nor blacks that Africans should becam 
permanent flindustrialistsl*. 
The massing of Natives in centres like the 
Witwatersrand ... leads gradually to the growth of m 
Urban population, poor, squalid, propertyless, easily 
inflammable, whom the Bolshevik Third International 
has already designated the best material through which 
to spread comunistic doctrine through Africa ... W 
only section profiting from the transaction is 
obviously big finance, usually absentfig big finance 
and therefore unafraid of the deluge. 
In 1928, after Brookes had rejected segregation, he announced that it had 
failed as a policy 'Ibecause black South Africa does not want it, and because white 
South Afri~a is not prepared to make the sacrifices without which it cannot 
succeedI1. This introduces a striking paradox: that, whereas the early Brookss 
believed in **protectivett segregation as a means of defending white South Africa 
against a militant black proletariat, he later came to the view that a policy of 
enforced segregation which precluded the possibility of African advazacement mid 
lead precisely to that result: 
Class becomes associated with something definite and 
tangible as colour. The stage is inevitably set for 
the 'class war1. As a member of the bourgeoisie 
myself, I hope it is not set for the 'dictatorship of 
the proletariat1. As a liberal I believe that only 
swift and far-reaching reforms and many more 
opportunities for self-realisation on the part of the 
Bantu can ensse the impossibility of such a 
dictatorship. 
The above discussion suggests thatliberalsdid not actively promote segregation as a 
means of hastening the process of capital accumulation in South Africa. TheJI did, 
however, help to maintain the conditions for the long-term reproduction of 
capitalist relations by acting to preserve social and political stability. This 
proposition introduces the important, but difficult, concept of "social cag13zwli' 
which has recently been brilliantly analysed by Thorn Haskel&n his article 
"Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility1'. In Haskellls via, 
an essential element in the idea of social control is the idea that a class 
will favour any measure that ensures the docility of 
the less advantaged sectors of the population, that 
enhances the discipline and productivity of the work 
force on which the economy depends, that strengthens 
its own morale or weakens that of other groups, or 
that contributes in aar; other way to the maintenance 
of its own supremacy. 
For Haskell, the chief problem with the social control thesis is that, 
however sophisticated its application, it is necessarily a reductive form of class 
analysis. And he adds that efforts to avoid crude reductionism through the use of 
cautious language can only be achieved by sacrificing an argument's explanatory 
force. One of the chief deficiencies in the social control thesis is its failure to 
specify the gap between the intentions of ideologists and the long-term consequences 
of their actions. In our case, a "hard" version of the social control thesis would 
assert that liberals elaborated segregation in order to promote the interests of 
capitalism and the bourgeoisie. By contrast, a "softerw interpretation would 
emphasize the idea of unconscious intentions or unintended consequences, the notion 
that liberal ideology is "rooted" in the needs of social groups, but not reducible 
to them. 
The existing South African literature tends towards a "hard" version of 
the social control thesis, either explici1;)y or by implication. This is often, but 
not always, the case in Legassick's work. It is present, too, in Belinda 
Bozzolits study of ruling-class ideology, in which she argues that liberal theorists 
and organizatiags actively set about dividing, conciliating and incorporating the 
working class. A "hardn form of the social control thesis is also detectable in 
Baruch Hirson's paper on the Joint Councils and the All-African Convention. Here he 
contends that, in the fifteen years prior to the promulgation of Hertzog's "Native 
Bills", $be Joint Councils acted to "dampen the movements of protest in South 
Africa". 
This is not to deny the substantial amount of truth in both the above 
arguments. My intention is only to challenge the impression that liberals, acting 
more or less directly in the interests of capital, consciously intended to secure a 
complaisant black working class. While this may indeed be the case in certain 
instances, it is misleading to believe that liberal ideologists were somehow able to 
see beyond their immediate historical context so as to dupe the forces of popular 
opposition. Segregation appears in this light as an act of trickery, wilfully 
imposed by liberal ideologues in a conspiratorial attempt to secure the hegemony of 
capital. This form of argument neglects the extent to which ideologies are believed 
in by their creators. Ideologies are not merely conceived in order to obscure the 
truth and to deceive others. They are also acts of self-deception, rationalization5 
intended not so much to obscure the truth as to boost the moral rectitude and self- 
confidence of those who stand to benefit materially from them. Indeed, the very 
effectiveness of an ideology depends at least partly on the extent to which those 
who subscribe to and propagate its terms also believe in them. 
Undoubtedly, liberal segregationists, by acting to defuse actual or 
potential class conflict, functioned as agents of social control. But this is not 
to say that they consciously or consistently saw their role in these terms. 
Segregation was founded on a notion of "differential sovereignty" whereby Africans9 
antecedent rights to a share in the land of South Africa was granted in return for 
their loss of their claims to citizenship. The hegemonic force of this ideology 
ensured that they remained trapped within the terms expressed by Hertzoggs quid pro 
quo of land for the vote, or "substance for shadow". The idiom of benevolent 
paternalism which suffused liberal segregationism between the wars and took the form 
of "trusteeship" was genuinely believed in by many of its proponents. This remained 
the case until liberal segregationists realized that economic and political 
realities determined that white supremacy was incompatible with IfAfrican 
advancementtf. Some liberals renounced segregation when this point hit home. 
Others, like Alfred Hoernle or J H Hofmeyr, attempted to revise liberal segregation 
in more modest terms. The success of segregation as a hegemonic or dominant 
ideology is measurable to the extent to which it was able (for a time at least) to 
draw on the support of most whites and some Africans as well. It served to define 
the boundaries o f  po l i t i ca l  debate and - though strongly cr i t i c i zed  by some 
contemporary observers - came to be seen as a nakedly fraudulent just i f icat ion of 
white supremacy only when modern conceptions o f  dernocracy rendered its fundamental 
premises utterly threadbare. 
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